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Abstract—Outsourcing integrated circuit (IC) manufacturing to
offshore foundries has grown exponentially in recent years. Given
the critical role of ICs in the control and operation of vehicular
systems and other modern engineering designs, such offshore
outsourcing has led to serious security threats due to the potential
of insertion of hardware trojans – malicious designs that, when
activated, can lead to highly detrimental consequences. In this
paper, a novel game-theoretic framework is proposed to analyze the
interactions between a hardware manufacturer, acting as attacker,
and an IC testing facility, acting as defender. The problem is
formulated as a noncooperative game in which the attacker must
decide on the type of trojan that it inserts while taking into account
the detection penalty as well as the damage caused by the trojan.
Meanwhile, the resource-constrained defender must decide on the
best testing strategy that allows optimizing its overall utility which
accounts for both damages and the fines. The proposed game
is based on the robust behavioral framework of prospect theory
(PT) which allows capturing the potential uncertainty, risk, and
irrational behavior in the decision making of both the attacker
and defender. For both, the standard rational expected utility
(EUT) case and the PT case, a novel algorithm based on fictitious
play is proposed and shown to converge to a mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium. For an illustrative case study, thorough analytical
results are derived for both EUT and PT to study the properties
of the reached equilibrium as well as the impact of key system
parameters such as the defender-set fine. Simulation results assess
the performance of the proposed framework under both EUT and
PT and show that the use of PT will provide invaluable insights on
the outcomes of the proposed hardware trojan game, in particular,
and system security, in general.
I. INTRODUCTION
The past decade has witnessed unprecedented advances in
the fabrication and design of integrated circuits (ICs). Indeed,
ICs have become an integral component in many engineering
domains ranging from transportation systems and critical infras-
tructures to robotics, communication, and vehicular systems [1].
For instance, the vast advancements in vehicular systems designs
have led to wide developments of vehicular electronics technolo-
gies and the proliferation of the integration of ICs in vehicular
systems. These massive advances in IC design have also had
many production implication. In particular, the flexibility of
modern IC design coupled with its ease of manufacturing have
led to the outsourcing of IC fabrication [2]. Such outsourcing
allows a cost-effective production of the IC circuitry of many
systems and critical infrastructures [2]–[4]. Moreover, the recent
interest in the use of commercial off-the-shelf devices in both
This research is supported by the U.S. National Science Foundation under
Grants CNS-1253731 and CNS-1406947 and by the Air Force Office of
Scientific Research (AFOSR).
civilian and military systems has also constituted yet another
motivation for outsourcing IC fabrication [5].
Relying on offshore foundries for IC manufacturing is a cost-
effective way for mass production of microcircuits. However,
such an outsourcing can lead to serious security threats. These
threats are exacerbated when the ICs in question are deployed
into critical applications such as vehicular systems, commu-
nication systems, power networks, transportation systems, or
military applications. One such threat is that of the hardware
trojan insertion by IC manufacturers [4], [6]–[10]. A hardware
trojan is a malicious design that can be introduced into an IC
at manufacturing. The trojan lies inactive until it is activated by
certain pre-set conditions when the IC is in use. Once activated,
the trojan can lead to a circuit error which, in turn, can lead
to detrimental consequences to the system in which the IC is
used. The threat of serious malicious IC alterations via hardware
trojans has become a major concern to governmental and private
agencies, as well as to the military, transportation, and energy
sectors [1]–[4], [6]–[10]. For instance, vehicular technologies
are known to be one of the main potential targets for hard-
ware trojans [11]–[14]. Indeed, due to their significant reliance
on microcontrollers, digital-signal processors, microprocessors,
commercial-off-the-shelf parts, and integrated circuits which can
come from a vast range of suppliers, vehicular systems can be a
prime target to electronic manipulation attacks and the insertion
of hardware trojans. For example, in a recent study of auto
industry trends [15], it was observed that electronic systems
contribute to 90% of automobile innovations and new features.
In addition, new airborne systems and military fighters contain
hundreds and thousands of chips [14] with a large number of
suppliers, spread around the world, making them a vulnerable
target to potential hardware trojan insertion.
Defending against hardware trojans and detecting their pres-
ence face many challenges that range from circuit testing and
design to economic and contractual issues [1]–[4], [6]–[10],
[16]–[18]. The majority of these works [6]–[10], [16]–[18]
focuses on IC and hardware-level testing procedures used to
activate or detect hardware trojans. This literature also highlights
a key limitation in testing for hardware trojans: there exists a
resource limitation that prevents testing for all possible types of
hardware trojans within a given circuit. While interesting, most
of these existing works do not take into account the possible
strategic interactions that can occur between the two entities
involved in hardware trojan detection: the manufacturer of the
IC and the recipient, such as the governmental agencies or
companies that are buying the ICs. Indeed, on the one hand, the
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manufacturer (viewed as an attacker) can strategically decide on
which type of trojan to insert while taking into account possible
testing strategies of the IC recipient. On the other hand, the
agency (viewed as a defender), must decide on which testing
process to use and for which trojans to test, given the possible
trojan types that a manufacturer can introduce. This motivates
the need for a mathematical framework that allows a better
understanding of these strategic interactions between the two
entities and their strategic behavior in order to anticipate the
outcome of such interaction.
To this end, recently, a number of research works [19]–[22]
have focused on modeling the strategic interaction between a
manufacturer and an agency (or client) in a hardware trojan
insertion/detection setting using game theory. In particular, the
works in [19] and [20] propose a game-theoretic method to test
the effectiveness of hardware trojan detection techniques. These
works have pinpointed the advantages of using game theory for
the development of better hardware trojan detection strategies.
In addition, the authors in [21] and [22] studied a zero-sum
game between a hardware trojan attacker and defender aiming
at characterizing the best detection strategy that the defender
can employ to face a strategic attacker which can insert one
of many types of trojans. Despite being interesting, these works
assume that the involved players always act with full rationality.
However, as has been experimentally tested in [23] and [24],
when faced with risks and uncertainty (as in the case of security
situations such as hardware trojan detection scenarios) humans
tend to act in a subjective and sometimes irrational manner.
The works in [19]–[22] do not take into account this subjectivity
which would significantly impact the game-theoretic results and
equivalently affect the optimal attack and defense strategies of
the involved entities. As such, a fundamentally new approach
is needed that incorporates this possible subjective behavior in
the game-theoretic formulation in order to quantify and assess
the impact of such subjectivity on the attacker’s and defender’s
strategies as well as on the hardware trojan detection game’s
outcome.
The main contribution of this paper is to propose a novel,
game-theoretic framework to understand how the attacker and
defender can interact in a hardware trojan detection game. We
formulate the problem as a noncooperative zero-sum game in
which the defender must select the trojan types for which it
wishes to test while the attacker must select a certain trojan
type to insert into the IC. In this game, the attacker aims to
maximize the damage that it inflicts on the defender via the
trojan-infected IC while the defender attempts to detect the
trojan and, subsequently, impose a penalty that would limit the
incentive of the attacker to insert a trojan. One key feature of the
proposed game is that it allows, based on the emerging frame-
work of prospect theory (PT), capturing the subjective behavior
of the attacker and defender when choosing their strategies
under uncertainty and risk that accompany the hardware trojan
detection decision making processes. This uncertainty and risk
stem from the lack of information that the attacker and defender
have on one another as well as from the tragic consequences on
the attacker and defender that are associated, respectively, with
a successful or unsuccessful detection of the trojan. Moreover,
such a subjective behavior can originate from the personality
traits of the humans involved (e.g, system administrators at
the defense side and hackers at the manufacturer’s side) which
guide their tendency of being risk seeking or risk averse. Using
PT enables studying how the attacker and defender can make
their decisions based on subjective perceptions on each others’
possible strategies and the accompanying gains and losses. To
our best knowledge, this is the first paper that applies tools
from PT to better understand the outcomes of such a security
game. Indeed, although game theory has been a popular tool
for network security (see survey in [25]), most existing works
are focused on games in which all players are rational (one
notable exception is in [26] which, however, focuses on resource
allocation and does not address hardware trojan detection).
Moreover, beyond some recent works on using PT for wireless
networking [27] and smart grid [28], no work seems to have
investigated how PT can impact system security, in general, and
trojan detection, in particular. To solve the game under both
standards, rational expected utility theory (EUT) and PT, we
propose an algorithm based on fictitious play that is shown to
converge to a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of the game.
Then, for an illustrative numerical case study, we derive several
analytical results on the equilibrium properties and the impact
of the fine (i.e. penalty) on the overall outcome of the game.
Simulation results show that PT provides insightful results on
how uncertainty and risk can impact the overall outcome of
a security game, in general, and a hardware trojan detection
game in particular. The results show that deviations from rational
EUT decision making can lead to unexpected outcomes for the
game. Therefore, these results will provide guidelines for system
designers to better understand how to counter hardware trojans
and malicious manufacturers.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
presents the system model and the formulation of a noncoop-
erative game for hardware trojan detection. In Section III, we
present a novel trojan detection framework based on PT while
in Section IV we devise an algorithm for solving the game.
Analytical and simulation results are presented and analyzed in
Section V while conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND GAME FORMULATION
A. System Model
Consider an IC manufacturer who produces ICs for different
governmental agencies or companies. This manufacturer, here-
inafter referred to as an “attacker”, has an incentive to introduce
hardware trojans to maliciously impact the cyber-infrastructure
that adopts the produced IC. Such a trojan, when activated, can
lead to errors in the circuit, potentially damaging the underlying
system. Here, we assume that the attacker can insert one trojan
t from a set T of T trojan types. Each trojan t ∈ T can lead to
a certain damage captured by a positive real-number Vt > 0.
Once the agency or company, hereinafter referred to as the
“defender”, receives the ICs, it can decide to test for one or
more types of trojans. Due to the complexity of modern IC
designs, it is challenging to develop test patterns that can be
used to readily and quickly verify the validity of a circuit with
respect to all possible trojan types. Particularly, the defender
must spend ample resources if it chooses to test for all possible
types of trojans. Such resources may be extremely costly. Thus,
we assume that the defender can only choose a certain subset
A ⊂ T of trojan types for which to test, where the total number
of trojans tested for is |A| < T . The practical aspects for testing
and verification of the circuit versus the subset of trojans A
can follow existing approaches such as the scan chain approach
developed in [29]. We assume that such testing techniques are
reliable and, thus, if the defender tests for the accurate type of
trojan, this trojan can then be properly detected.
Here, if the defender tests for the right types of trojans
that have been inserted in the circuit, then, the attacker will
be penalized. This penalty is mathematically expressed by a
fine Ft if the trojan detected is of type t. The magnitude
and severity of this penalty depends on the seriousness of
the threat. Thus, this fine is a mathematical representation of
the legal consequences of the detection of the induced threat
on the manufacturing company and the involved personnel
including the termination of the contract (highly damaging the
reputation of the manufacturer) between the two parties as well
as monetary penalties that the manufacturer is required to pay
for the defender.
Our key goal is to understand the interactions between the
defender and attacker in such a hardware trojan detection
scenario. In particular, it is of interest to devise an approach
using which one can understand how the defender and attacker
can decide on the types of trojans that they will test for or insert,
respectively, and how those actions impact the overall damage
on the system. Such an approach will provide insights on the
optimal testing choices for the defender, given various possible
actions that could be taken by the attacker.
B. Noncooperative Game Formulation
For the studied hardware trojan detection model, the decision
of the defender regarding for which trojans to test is impacted by
its perception of the potential decisions of an attacker regarding
which type of trojan to insert and vice versa. Moreover, the
choices by both attacker and defender will naturally determine
whether any damages will be done to the system or whether any
penalty must be imposed. Due to this coupling in the actions
and objectives of the attacker and defender, the framework of
noncooperative game theory [30] provides suitable analytical
tools for modeling, analyzing, and understanding the decision
making processes involved in the studied attacker-defender
hardware trojan detection scenario.
To this end, we formulate a static zero-sum noncooperative
game in strategic form Ξ = {N , {Si}i∈N , {ui}i∈N } which is
defined by its three main components: (i) the players which are
the attacker a and the defender d in the set1 N := {a, d}, (ii)
the strategy space Si of each player i ∈ N , and (iii) the utility
function ui of any player i ∈ N .
For the attacker, the strategy space is simply the set of
possible trojan types, i.e., Sa = T . Thus, an attacker can choose
one type of trojans to insert in the circuit being designed or
manufactured. For the defender, given the possibly large number
of trojans that must be tested for, we assume that the defender
can only choose to test for K trojan types simultaneously. The
1This two-player game formulation captures practical cases in which one
system operator defends its system against trojan insertion while the system
is considered not to be extremely vulnerable, in the sense that, most of the
manufacturers are trusted while very few (in our case a single manufacturer)
are malicious. Our generated results and proposed techniques can also form
the basis for future works focusing on applications in which the existence of
multiple attackers or multiple defenders represents a more practical case.
actual value of K would be determined exogeneously to the
game via factors such as the resources available for the defender
and the type of circuitry being tested. For a given K, the strategy
space Sd of the defender will then be the set of possible subsets
of T of size K. Therefore, each defender will have to choose
one of such subsets, denoted by sd ∈ Sd.
For each defender’s choice of a size-K trojans set sd ∈ Sd
for which to test and attacker’s choice of trojan type sa ∈ Sa to
be inserted, the defender’s utility function ud(sd, sa) will be:
ud(sd, sa) =
{
Fsa if sa ∈ sd,
−Vsa otherwise,
(1)
where Vsa is the damage
2 done by trojan sa if it goes undetected.
Given the zero-sum nature of the game, the utility of the attacker
is simply ua(sd, sa) = −ud(sd, sa).
III. PROSPECT THEORY FOR HARDWARE TROJAN
DETECTION: UNCERTAINTY AND RISK IN DECISION
MAKING
A. Mixed Strategies and Expected Utility Theory
For the studied hardware trojan detection game, it is rea-
sonable to assume that both defender and attacker make prob-
abilistic choices over their strategies; and therefore, we are
interested in studying the game under mixed strategies [30]
rather than under pure, deterministic strategies. The rationale
for such mixed probabilistic choices is two-fold: a) both attacker
and defender must randomize between their strategies so as not
to make it trivial for the opponent to guess their strategy and
b) the hardware trojan detection game can be repeated over an
infinite horizon; and therefore, mixed strategies allow capturing
the frequencies with which the attacker or defender would use
a certain strategy.
To this end, let p = [pd pa] be the vector of mixed strategies
of both players where, for the defender, each element in pd is
the probability with which the defender chooses a certain size-K
subset sd ∈ Sd of trojans for which to test; and for the attacker,
each element in pa represents the probability with which the
attacker chooses to insert a trojan sa ∈ Sa.
In traditional game theory [30], it is assumed that players
act rationally. This rational assumption implies that each player,
attacker or defender, will objectively choose its mixed strategy
vector so as to optimize its expected utility. Indeed, under
conventional expected utility theory (EUT), the utility of each
player is simply the expected value over its mixed strategies
which, for any of the two players i ∈ N , is given by:
UEUTi (pd,pa) =
∑
s∈S
(
pd(sd)pa(sa)
)
ui(s), (2)
where s = [sd sa] is a vector of selected pure strategies and
S = Sd × Sa.
2Vsa is a mathematical quantization of the volume of the damage that trojan
sa inflicts on the system when activated. Such a quantization requires accurate
modeling of the underlying system and the interconnection between its various
components. The incorporation of the system model in the problem formulation
can be treated in a future work.
B. Prospect Theory for the Hardware Trojan Detection Game
In conventional game theory, EUT allows the players to
evaluate an objective expected utility such as in (2) in which
they are assumed to act rationally and to objectively assess
their outcomes. However, in real-world experiments, it has been
observed that users’ behavior can deviate considerably from
the rational behavior predicted by EUT. The reasons for these
deviations are often attributed to the risk and uncertainty that
players often face when making decisions over game-theoretic
outcomes.
In particular, several empirical studies [23], [31]–[35] have
demonstrated that when faced with decisions that involve gains
and losses under risks and uncertainty, such as in the proposed
hardware trojan detection game, players can have a subjective
evaluation of their utilities. In the studied game, both the attacker
and defender face several uncertainties. In fact, the defender
can never be sure of which type of trojans the attacker will be
inserting; and thus, when evaluating its outcomes using (2), it
may overweight or underweight the mixed-strategy vector of the
attacker pa. Similarly, the attacker may also evaluate its utility
given a distorted and uncertain view of the defender’s possible
strategies. In addition, the decisions of both attacker and de-
fender involve humans (e.g., administrators at the governmental
agency or hackers at the manufacturer) who might guide the
way in which trojans are inserted or tested for. This human
dimension will naturally lead to potentially irrational behavior
that can be risk averse or risk seeking; thus, deviating from the
rational tenets of classical game theory and EUT.
For the proposed game, such considerations of risk and
uncertainty in decision making can translate into the fact that
each player i must decide on its action, in the face of the
uncertainty induced by the mixed strategies of its opponent,
which impacts directly the utility as in (2). In order to capture
such risk and uncertainty factors in the proposed hardware
detection game, we turn to the emerging framework of prospect
theory (PT) [23].
One important notion from PT that is useful for the proposed
hardware trojan detection game is the so-called weighting effect
on the game’s outcomes. For instance, PT studies [23], [31]–
[35] have demonstrated that, in real-life, players of a certain
adversarial or competitive game tend to introduce subjective
weighting of outcomes that are subject to uncertainty or risk.
For the hardware trojan detection game, we use the weighting
effect as a way to measure how each player can view a distorted
or subjective evaluation of the mixed strategy of its opponents.
This subjective evaluation represents the limits on the rationality
of the defender and attacker under the uncertainty and lack of
exact knowledge of the possible actions of the adversary.
Thus, under PT considerations, for a player i ∈ N , instead
of objectively perceiving the mixed strategy pj chosen by the
adversary, each player views a weighted or distorted version
of it, wi(pj), which is a nonlinear transformation that maps
an objective probability to a subjective one. The exact way in
which this transformation is defined is based on recent empirical
studies in [23], [31]–[35], which show that players, in real-life
decision making, tend to underweight high probability outcomes
and overweight low probability outcomes [23]. For our analysis,
for each player i, we choose the widely used Prelec function
which can capture the previously mentioned weighting effect as
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Fig. 1: Illustration of the impact of the rationality parameter αi.
follows [31] (for a given probability pi):
wi(pi) = exp(−(− ln pi)αi), 0 < αi ≤ 1, (3)
where αi will be referred to as the rationality parameter which
allows to express the distortion between player i’s subjective and
objective probability perception. This parameter allows charac-
terizing how rational the attacker or defender is by measuring
how much the uncertainty and risk that this player faces distort
its view of the opponents’ probability. Note that when αi = 1,
this is reduced to the conventional EUT probability with full
rationality. An illustration on the impact of αi is shown in Fig. 1.
The Prelec function has been widely used to model the
weighting effect of PT due to its mathematical properties which
allow it to fit various experimental observations [23], [31]. These
properties include: 1) the Prelec function, w(p), is regressive
indicating that at the start of the range of definition of p,
w(p) > p, but then afterwards, w(p) < p , 2) the Prelec function
has an S-shape which captures the fact that it is first concave
then convex, and 3) w(p) is asymmetric with fixed point and
inflection point at p = 1/e ≈ 0.37. This has made the Prelec
function widely used in PT models such as the case in [27],
[28], and [36], among others. Here, we note that a number
of alternative weighting functions have also been derived in
literature and are discussed thoroughly in [37]. To derive other
functions, real-world experiments with real human subjects
are needed. However, in general, our proposed framework can
accommodate any weighting function.
Given these PT-based uncertainty and risk considerations, the
expected utility achieved by a player i will thus be:
UPTi (pi,pj) =
∑
s∈S
(
pi(si)wi(pj(sj))
)
ui(si, sj), (4)
where i and j correspond, respectively, to the defender and
attacker, and vice versa. Clearly, in (4), the uncertainty is
captured via each player’s weighting of its opponent’s strategy.
This weighting depends on the rationality of the player under
uncertainty, which can be captured by αi.
Given this re-definition of the game, our next step is to study
and discuss the game solution under both EUT and PT.
IV. GAME SOLUTION AND PROPOSED ALGORITHM
A. Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium
To solve the proposed game, under both EUT and PT, we
seek to characterize the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of the
game:
Definition 1. A mixed strategy profile p∗ is said to be a mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium if for the defender, d, and attacker, a,
we have:
Ud(p
∗
d,p
∗
a) ≥ Ud(pd,p∗a), ∀pd ∈ Pd,
Ua(p
∗
a,p
∗
d) ≥ Ua(pa,p∗d), ∀pa ∈ Pa, (5)
where Pi is the set of all probability distributions available to
player i over its action space Si. Note that, the mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium definition in (5) is applicable for both EUT
or PT, the difference would be in whether one is using (2) or
(4), respectively.
The mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE) represents a
state of the game in which neither the defender nor the attacker
has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from its current mixed-
strategy choice, given that the opposing player uses an MSNE
strategy. Under EUT, this implies that under a rational choice
the MSNE represents the case in which the defender has chosen
its optimal randomization over its testing strategies and, thus,
cannot improve its utility by changing these testing strategies;
assuming that the attacker is also rational and utility maximizing
as per EUT. Similarly, for the attacker, an MSNE under EUT
implies that the attacker has chosen its optimal randomization
over its choice of trojan to insert and, thus, cannot improve
its utility by changing this choice of trojan; assuming that the
defender is also rational and utility maximizing as per EUT.
Under PT, at the MSNE neither the attacker nor the defender
can improve their perceived and subjective utility evaluation as
per (4) by changing their MSNE strategies given their rationality
levels captured by αd and αa. Thus, under PT the MSNE is a
state of the game in which neither the defender nor the attacker
can further improve their utilities by unilaterally deviating from
the MSNE, under their current uncertain perception on one
another.
Given the zero-sum two-player nature of the game, finding
closed-form solutions for the MSNE can follow the von Neu-
mann indifference principle [30] under which, for each player
at the MSNE, the expected utilities of any pure strategy choice,
under the mixed strategies played by the opponent, are equal.
Such a principle can be trivially shown to be applicable to both
EUT and PT due to the one-to-one relationship between the
probabilities and the weights. For the proposed game, given
the large strategy space of both defender and attacker, it is
challenging to solve the equations that stem from the indiffer-
ence principle, for a general case. However, as will be shown
for a numerical case study in Section V, the game may admit
multiple equilibrium points. Therefore, given an initial starting
point of the system, one must develop learning algorithms [38]
to characterize one of the MSNEs, as proposed next.
B. Proposed Algorithm: Fictitious Play and Convergence Re-
sults
To solve the studied hardware trojan detection game, under
both EUT and PT, we propose a learning algorithm, summa-
rized in Table 1, which is based on the fictitious play (FP)
algorithm [30], [38]. In this algorithm, each player uses its
belief about the mixed strategy that its opponent will adopt.
This belief stems from previous observations and is updated in
every iteration. In this regard, let σki be player i’s perception of
the mixed strategy that j adopts at time instant k. Here, each
Algorithm 1 Distributed Fictitious Play Learning Algorithm
Input: Action space of the defender, Sd
Action space of the attacker, Sa
Convergence parameter, M
Output: Equilibrium mixed strategy vector of each player, p∗d
and p∗a
1: Initialize σ0a and σ
0
d
2: Initialize convergence tester: Ctest = 0
3: Initialize iteration counter: k = 1
4: while Not Converged: Ctest == 0 do
5: Each player chooses its optimal strategy:
skd = arg maxsd∈Sd Ud(sd,σ
k−1
d )
ska = arg maxsa∈Sa Ua(sa,σ
k−1
a )
6: Each player updates its observed empirical frequency:
σkd(sa) =
k−1
k · σk−1d (sa) + 1k · 1{sk−1a =ska}∀sa ∈ Sa,
σka(sd) =
k−1
k · σk−1a (sd) + 1k · 1{sk−1d =skd},∀sd ∈ Sd
7: Check Convergence
Calculate:
Cd(sa) = |σkd(sa)− σk−1d (sa)| ∀sa ∈ Sa,
Ca(sd) = |σka(sd)− σk−1a (sd)| ∀sd ∈ Sd
8: if Converged:
Cd(sa) <
1
M && Ca(sd) <
1
M ∀sa ∈ Sa, ∀sd ∈ Sd
then
9: Ctest = 1
10: Compute strategy vectors:
p∗d = [σ
k
a(s1), σ
k
a(s2), ..., σ
k
a(s|Sd|)]
p∗a = [σ
k
d(s1), σ
k
d(s2), ..., σ
k
d(s|Sd|)]
11: end if
12: Update Counter: k=k+1
13: end while
14: return Strategy vectors: p∗d and p∗a
entry of σki , given by σ
k
i (sj), represents the belief that i has
at time k of the probability with which j will play the strategy
sj ∈ Sj . Such perception can be built based on the empirical
frequency with which j has used sj in the past. Thus, let ηki (sj)
be the number of times that i has observed j playing strategy sj
in the past, up to time instant k. Then, σki (sj) for each sj ∈ Sj
can be calculated as follows:
σki (sj) =
ηki (sj)∑
s′j∈Sj η
k
i (s
′
j)
. (6)
To this end, at time instant k + 1, based on the vector of
empirical probabilities that it has perceived until time instant k,
σki , each player i chooses the strategy s
k+1
i that maximizes its
expected utility:
sk+1i = arg max
si∈Si
Ui(si,σ
k
i ), (7)
where the expected utility is calculated as the expected value
of the the utility achieved by player i, when choosing strategy
si, with respect to the perceived probability distribution at time
instant k over the set of actions of the opponent, σki . This is
equivalent to the notion of expected utility that we derived in (2)
and (4) under, respectively, EUT and PT.
After each player i chooses its strategy at time instant k+ 1,
it can update its beliefs as follows:
σk+1i (sj) =
k
k + 1
· σki (sj) +
1
k + 1
· 1{skj=sk+1j }, (8)
which is equivalent to calculating σk+1i (sj) based on (6).
In summary, at iteration k + 1, player i observes the actions
of its opponent up to time k and updates its perception of its
opponent’s mixed strategy based on (6) or, equivalently, (8).
Subsequently, at time k + 1, player i chooses a strategy sk+1i
from its available strategy set Si which maximizes its expected
utility with respect to its updated perceived empirical frequen-
cies as shown in (7). This expected utility would follow (2) for
EUT and (4) for PT. However, in the case of PT, after computing
the empirical frequency based on (6), these frequencies are
weighed based on (3) such that, when choosing its optimal
strategy sk+1i as in (7), each player i uses ωi(σ
k
i ) instead of σ
k
i .
When this weighting is performed, we denote Ui(si, ωi(σki )) by
UPTi (si,σ
k
i ).
This learning process proceeds until the calculated empirical
frequencies converge. Convergence is achieved when:
|σk+1i (sj)− σki (sj)| <
1
M
, ∀sj ∈ Sj , ∀i ∈ N (9)
where M is an arbitrary large number (that typically goes to
infinity).
This algorithm requires initialization of the vectors of beliefs.
Thus, we let σ0d and σ
0
a be the initial values adopted, respec-
tively, by the defender and attacker. Such initialization vectors
can be based on previous experience or can be any arbitrary
probability distribution over the action space of the opponent.
This algorithm is shown in details in Table 1.
For a two-player zero-sum game, it is well known that FP is
guaranteed to converge to an MSNE [30], [38]. In other words, it
is guaranteed that the empirical frequency that player i builds of
the actions of its opponent j converges to, σ∗i , which is nothing
but the MSNE strategy of its opponent, i.e. p∗j (defined in
Definition 1). The convergence to σ∗i is mathematically defined
as the existence of an iteration number κi such that, for k > κi
the belief of player i ∈ N , σki , converges to σ∗i , i.e.
|σki (sj)− σ∗i (sj)| <

M
∀sj ∈ Sj , (10)
where M is an arbitrary large number (that typically goes to
infinity) and  is a positive constant. Hence, for our studied
case, σ∗a converges to to the MSNE of the defender, p
∗
d, and
σ∗d converges to the MSNE of the attacker, p
∗
a. However, to our
knowledge, such a result has not been extended to PT, as done
in the following theorem:
Theorem 1. For the proposed hardware trojan detection game,
the proposed FP-based algorithm is guaranteed to converge to
a mixed NE under both EUT and PT.
Proof. The convergence of FP to an MSNE for EUT in a two-
player zero-sum game is a known result [30], [38], [39]. For
PT, one can easily verify that the convergence to a fixed point
will directly follow from the EUT results in [30], [38], [39].
However, what remains to be shown is that this convergence
will actually reach an MSNE for the case of PT. We prove this
case using contradiction as follows.
Suppose that {σk} is a fictitious play process that will
converge to a fixed point and a mixed strategy p∗ after k
iterations (i.e. σki converges to p
∗
j for both players after k
iterations). If the vector p∗ = {p∗i ,p∗j} is not an MSNE, then
there must exist si, s′i ∈ Si, such that p∗i (si) > 0 and
UPTi
(
s′i,p
∗
j
)
> UPTi
(
si,p
∗
j
)
,
where UPTi (s
′
i,p
∗
j ) is the expected utility with respect to the
mixed strategies of j, the opponents of player i, when player
i chooses pure strategy s′i. Here, we can choose a value  that
satisfies
0 <  <
1
2
|UPTi (s′i,p∗j )− UPTi (si,p∗j )| (11)
as σk converges to p∗ at iteration k. Also, since the FP process
decreases as the number of iterations n increases, the utility
distance of a pure strategy between two neighboring iterations
must be less than  after a certain iteration k. For n ≥ k, the
FP process can be written as:
UPTi (si,σ
n
i ) =
∑
sj∈Sj
ui(si, sj)wi(σ
n
i (sj))
≤
∑
sj∈Sj
ui(si, sj)wi(p
∗
j (sj)) + 
<
∑
sj∈Sj
ui(s
′
i, sj)wi(p
∗
j (sj))− 
≤
∑
sj∈Sj
ui(s
′
i, sj)wi(σ
n
i (sj))
=UPTi (s
′
i,σ
n
i ),
(12)
where the two equalities in (12) stem directly from the definition
of expected utility given in (4) when i’s strategy is fixed to si
or s′i, and the transition from step 2 to step 3 stem directly
from (11). Thus, player i would not choose si but would rather
choose s′i after the n
th iteration; mathematically, we will have
pi(si) = 0 and wj(σj(si)) = 0 (the other player’s perception of
pi(si)). Hence, we get pi(si) = 0 which contradicts the initial
assumption that pi(si) > 0; thus the theorem is shown.
V. NUMERICAL CASE STUDY: ANALYTICAL AND
SIMULATION RESULTS
For simulating the hardware trojan detection game, we con-
sider the scenario in which the attacker, denoted hereinafter by
player 1, has four types of trojans (strategies) A, B, C, and D,
i.e., Sa = T = {A,B,C,D} whose damage values are VA = 1,
VB = 2, VC = 4, and VD = 12. These numbers are used to
illustrate different damage levels to the system. For example,
these values can be viewed as monetary losses to the defender
and, hence, attacking gains to the attacker. Given that there are
no existing empirical data on the hardware detection game, we
have chosen illustrative numbers that show four varying levels
of damage. However, naturally, the subsequent analysis may be
extended to analyze the game under other damage values. In
this scenario, we assume that the defender, referred to as player
2, can test for K = 2 types of trojans at a time and, thus, it has
6 strategies. Without loss of generality, we assume that the fine
is similar for all types of trojans, i.e., Fsa = F ∀sa ∈ Sa.
For this numerical case study, we will first derive several
analytical results that allow us to gain more insights on the
proposed hardware detection game under both EUT and PT
representations. Then, we present several simulation results that
provide additional insights and analysis on the proposed game
and on the impact of PT consideration in the game model.
A. Analytical Results
In this subsection, we derive a series of results to gain more
insights on the Nash equilibria of the game as well as on the
possible values of the fine and how they impact the game under
both PT and EUT. First, we can state the following theorem
with regard to the Nash equilibria of the game under both EUT
and PT:
Theorem 2. When F > 0, under both EUT and PT, the
proposed game can admit multiple equilibria. However, in all of
these equilibria, the attacker has the same mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium strategies.
Proof. To capture the pure strategy payoffs of the defender given
the attacker’s mixed strategy, we use the indifference principle
as per the following equation:
Ud(sd,p
∗
a) =Ma · p∗a
Ud(AB,p
∗
a)
Ud(AC,p
∗
a)
Ud(AD,p
∗
a)
Ud(BC,p
∗
a)
Ud(BD,p
∗
a)
Ud(CD,p
∗
a)
 =

F F −4 −12
F −2 F −12
F −2 −4 F
−1 F F −12
−1 F −4 F
−1 −2 F F
 ·

p∗a(A)
p∗a(B)
p∗a(C)
p∗a(D)
 , (13)
where p∗a(A) + p
∗
a(B) + p
∗
a(C) + p
∗
a(D) = 1. Ma is the utility
matrix of the attacker which we can use to obtain the attacker’s
p∗a. Using the indifference principle, for the defender, an MSNE
must satisfy Ud(AB,p∗a) = Ud(AC,p
∗
a) = Ud(AD,p
∗
a) =
Ud(BC,p
∗
a) = Ud(BD,p
∗
a) = Ud(CD,p
∗
a). In addition,
rank(Ma) = rank


F F −4 −12
0 −2− F F + 4 0
0 −2− F 0 F + 12
−1 F F −12
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

 = 4.
(14)
Thus, the attacker has only one solution p∗a since: 1) the rank of
the attacker’s utility matrix is equal to the dimension of its mixed
strategy and 2) the auxiliary equation
∑
sa
p∗a(sa) = 1 balances
the requirement of Ud(sd,p∗a) in (13). Similarly, we capture the
pure strategy payoffs of the attacker via the defender’s mixed
strategy:
Ua(sa,p
∗
d) = Md · p∗d, (15)
where Md = −MTa . In particular,
∑
sd
p∗d(sd) = 1 and
Ua(A,p
∗
d) = Ua(B,p
∗
d) = Ua(C,p
∗
d) = Ua(D,p
∗
d) at the
MSNE for the attacker. Since the rank of the defender’s utility
matrix, rank(Md) = rank(Ma) = 4, is less than the number of
defender’s strategies, we get multiple defender MSNE strategies.
As an example, when F = 8 in (13) and (15), we
could obtain the only NE for the attacker under EUT, p∗a =
[0.32, 0.29, 0.24, 0.16]T . Also, we can compute the multiple
NEs of the defender under EUT:
p∗d(AB) =− 0.2259 + pd(CD),
p∗d(AC) =− 0.1290 + pd(BD),
p∗d(AD) =0.7097− pd(BD)− pd(CD),
p∗d(BC) =0.6452− pd(BD)− pd(CD).
(16)
Under PT, the auxiliary equation is equivalent to∑
p exp(−(− lnw(p))
1
α ) = 1. This equation does not
change the ranks of neither Ma nor Md nor the number of
eigenvalues. Thus, based on Cayley-Hamilton theorem, PT and
EUT have the same number of eigenvalues and then, have the
same number of MSNEs. This is applicable for any value of
the fine.
Next, we show that, for both EUT and PT, there exists a value
F v for the fine at which neither the attacker nor the defender
will win, i.e., the value of the game is zero:
Theorem 3. For EUT and PT, at the MSNE, there exists a fine
value, respectively, F vEUT and F
v
PT such that neither the attacker
nor the defender wins.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Given Theorem 3, we can show the following result:
Corollary 1. There exists a minimum fine value Fmin, such that,
the utility of the attacker will be positive (the attacker wins
overall) under both EUT and PT, i.e. Ua > 0, Ud < 0.
Proof. Based on Theorem 3, it can be shown that the utilities of
the attacker and defender intersect at 0. Also, the derivative of
the utility with respect to F can be easily seen to be monotonic.
Thus, there exists a fine Fmin such that Ua > 0 and Ud < 0.
Remark 1. The generalization of the results in Theo-
rems 2 and 3 is directly dependent on the general computation of
the rank of matrix Ma for an arbitrary number of trojan types,
number of types for which the defender can simultaneously
test, as well as the fine and damage values associated with
every trojan type. The derivation of Theorems 2 and 3, in this
section, and the proposed algorithm in Table 1 provide a general
methodology which can be followed to derive, respectively,
analytical and numerical results for any general trojan detection
game.
B. Numerical Results
In this subsection, we run extensive simulations to un-
derstand the way PT and EUT considerations impact the
hardware trojan detection game. To obtain the mixed Nash
equilibrium under EUT and PT, we use the proposed algo-
rithm in Table 1. The initial strategies are chosen as fol-
lows: we choose the attacker’s initial strategy set as pa =
[0.2083 0.1667 0.3333 0.2917]T and the defender’s initial strat-
egy set as pd = [0.2051 0.2564 0.2564 0.0513 0.0513 0.1795]T .
In the subsequent simulations, we assume that the fine for all
trojans is equal to Fsa = F = 8, ∀sa ∈ Sa, unless stated
otherwise. We vary the values of the rationality parameters αa
(for the attacker) and αd (for the defender).
Fig. 2 shows the four mixed strategies for the attacker at both
the EUT and PT equilibria reached via fictitious play. In this
figure as well as in Figs. 3 and 4, we choose αa = αd = 0.5
for both attacker and defender under PT reflecting the same
level of subjectivity in the behavior of the attacker and defender.
Here, we can first see that the equilibrium mixed strategies of
the attacker are different between PT and EUT. Under PT, the
attacker is more likely to insert trojans such as A or B, as
compared to EUT, whose value is less than C and D. This shows
that the attacker becomes more risk averse under PT and, thus,
aims at inserting low-valued trojans, rather than focusing on
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Fig. 2: Attacker mixed-strategies at the equilibrium for both
EUT and PT with αa = αd = 0.5.
AB AC AD BC BD CD0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Defender’s Mixed Strategy NE
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 o
f P
la
yi
ng
 E
ac
h 
Pu
re
 S
tra
te
gy
 
 
EUT
PT
Fig. 3: Defender mixed-strategies at the equilibrium for both
EUT and PT with αa = αd = 0.5.
higher valued trojans which are more likely to be detected due
to their prospective damage. The impact of such risk aversion on
the defender’s behavior at the equilibrium is more pronounced
as seen in Fig. 3. Under PT, the defender will more aggressively
attempt to test for the trojan with the highest damage. In this
respect, we can see that, under PT, the defender will have a
55% likelihood to test for the two most damaging trojans while
ignoring the tests that pertain to trojans A and B.
A conservative PT-based defense approach coupled with a
risk-averse attacker will naturally lead to a lower overall detec-
tion probability and, thus, will lead to further damage to the
system, when compared with the fully rational path of EUT.
In other words, compared to rational EUT, the attacker is more
likely to win in the PT scenario in which both the attacker and
the defender deviate from the rational behavior. This result is
corroborated in Fig. 4. In this figure, we show the expected
utility of the attacker and defender, at both the EUT and PT
equilibria. Clearly, under PT, the attacker is able to incur more
damage as compared to EUT, and thus, the overall value of
the game decreases from 2.1930 to 1.5356; a 30% decrease in
utility!
In Fig. 5, we show the expected utility for both PT and
EUT, as the value of the fine varies for αa = αd = 0.5.
The results in Fig. 5 are used to highlight the impact of
the value of the fine and corroborate some of the insights
of the theorems in Subsection V-A. First, Fig. 5 shows the
expected result that, as the fine value increases, the overall utility
achieved by the defender increases while that of the attacker
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Fig. 4: Expected utility at the equilibrium for the attacker and
the defender under both EUT and PT with αa = αd = 0.5.
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Fig. 5: The utility performance as the value of the fine F varies
for both EUT and PT with αa = αd = 0.5.
decreases, for both EUT and PT. In this figure, we can see
that, under EUT and based on Theorem 3, the value of the
fine for which neither the attacker nor the defender wins is
3. In particular, at the crossing point, the attacker’s MSNE is
p∗a = [0.3818 0.3022 0.2133 0.1027] and F
v
EUT = 3.0491 as
in (20). For higher values, Fig. 5 shows that under EUT the
defender starts achieving a winning utility. More interestingly,
we can see through Fig. 5 that, for PT, the value of the fine for
which the utilities are 0 is 4 which is greater than that of EUT.
This implies that, under irrational behavior and uncertainty, the
defender must set higher fines in order to start gaining over the
attacker. Moreover, Fig. 5 shows that, for this choice of αa and
αd, the defender is better off under EUT rather than PT.
Figs. 6-9 show the equilibrium strategies and corresponding
utilities for both EUT and PT, for two scenarios: i) Scenario
1 in which the attacker uses αa = 0.5 while the defender is
significantly deviating from the rational path, i.e., αd = 0.1,
and ii) Scenario 2 in which the defender uses αd = 0.5 while
the attacker is significantly deviating from the rational path, i.e.,
αa = 0.1. In this respect, Fig. 6 and Fig. 8 show the mixed
strategies of, respectively, the attacker and defender under the
two scenarios. In addition, Fig. 7 and Fig. 9 show the expected
utility achieved by, respectively, the attacker and defender under
the two scenarios.
In the first scenario, the defender becomes extremely risk-
averse and spends all of its resources for testing the combina-
tions pertaining to the most lethal trojan as shown in Fig. 8.
This, in turn, will leave the defender at a disadvantage. Indeed,
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Fig. 6: Attacker mixed strategies at the equilibrium for both
EUT and PT with i) Scenario 1: αa = 0.5 and αd = 0.1, and
ii) Scenario 2: αa = 0.1 and αd = 0.5.
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Fig. 7: Expected utility at the equilibrium for the attacker and
the defender under both EUT and PT with αa = 0.5 and αd =
0.1 (Scenario 1).
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Fig. 8: Defender mixed strategies at the equilibrium for both
EUT and PT with i) Scenario 1: αa = 0.5 and αd = 0.1, and
ii) Scenario 2: αa = 0.1 and αd = 0.5.
under such a significantly conservative defense strategy, the
attacker finds it less risky to simply mix its attacks between the
two trojans with lowest damage A and B as shown in Fig. 6.
By doing so, inadvertently, the attacker will benefit and will
become more likely to emerge as a winner in the game. This is
demonstrated by the results in Fig. 7 where we can see that the
value of the game decreases by about 76%.
In the second scenario, by being completely irrational about
the perceived defense strategies, under PT, the attacker keeps
attempting to insert the most damaging trojan D as shown in
Fig. 6. In contrast, as the defender remains relatively risk averse
for αd = 0.5, it spends most of its effort to detect the trojans
with most damage CD as shown in Fig. 8. By leveraging its
“rationality” advantage, the defender can continuously detect the
attacker’s trojan and, thus, as seen in Fig. 9, the average value
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Fig. 9: Expected utility at the equilibrium for the attacker and
the defender under both EUT and PT with αa = 0.1 and αd =
0.5 (Scenario 2).
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Fig. 10: Equilibrium mixed strategies under PT and EUT
for the most conservative defender and attacker options as the
rationality of both players αa = αd = α varies.
of the game is equal to 8, which is the value of the fine.
In Fig. 10, we study the case in which both attacker and de-
fender have an equal rationality parameter, i.e., αa = αd = α. In
this figure, we show the equilibrium mixed-strategy probability
for the most damaging strategy D for the attacker and the most
defensive strategy CD, for the defender. Fig. 10 shows very
interesting insights on the trojan hardware detection game. First,
for games in which both the defender and the attacker signif-
icantly deviate from the rational path (α < 0.3), the outcome
of the game leads to both players using their most conservative
strategies, with probability 1. This directly implies that, for this
highly irrational case, the defender will always emerge as a
winner. In contrast, for the regime 0.3 ≤ α ≤ 0.7, under
which both the attacker and the defender are not completely
rational (but have equal rationality level), the attacker becomes
less likely to use its most damaging strategy D, as compared to
the fully rational case, while the defender becomes more likely
to use its most protective strategy CD, in comparison to the
fully rational case. This naturally translates in an advantage for
the attacker (compared to the EUT case) as seen previously in
Figs. 4 and 7 as well as in Fig. 11.
Fig. 12 shows the expected utility at both the PT and EUT
equilibria for a scenario in which the defender is completely
rational (αd = 1) while the attacker has a varying rationality
parameter. Fig. 12 shows that, under a completely rational
defense strategy, the EUT performance will upper bound the
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Fig. 11: Expected utility at the equilibrium under PT and EUT
for the most conservative defender and attacker options as the
rationality of both players αa = αd = α varies.
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Fig. 12: The expected utility at the equilibrium as the rationality
of the attacker varies, under a completely rational defender with
αd = 1.
attacker’s performance. In other words, the attacker cannot do
better than by behaving somewhat in line with the rational path,
as the two utilities coincide for αa > 0.3. Moreover, under a
perfectly rational defense strategy, the attacker will immediately
be detected if it deviates significantly from the EUT behavior,
as evidenced in Fig. 12 by the expected utility achieved for
α < 0.3.
In Fig. 13, we consider the case in which the attacker is
completely rational αa = 1 while the defender has a varying
rationality level. Fig. 13 shows that, as the rationality of the de-
fender increases, its defense mechanism performs better. Indeed,
by avoiding extremely conservative and irrational perceptions of
the attack strategy, i.e., for αd ≥ 0.4, the defender can maintain
the performance of the system within the bounds of the fully
rational EUT behavior even if its own rationality is below that of
the attacker. In contrast, for αd < 0.4, the fully rational attacker
will be able to exploit its rationality advantage and will thus have
better chances of damaging the system. This damage increases
with decreasing αd. The worst-case system operation occurs
when the defender has a rationality parameter of αd ≤ 0.2.
Here, we note that the Nash equilibrium strategies for the
attacker and the defender under both EUT and PT which have
been introduced and analyzed in this section were obtained using
the proposed solution algorithm in Table 1. In all of the studied
cases, the algorithm has successfully converged in a relatively
short period of time. In fact, by inspecting the algorithm in Table
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Fig. 13: The expected utility at the equilibrium as the rationality
of the defender varies, under a completely rational attacker with
αa = 1.
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Fig. 14: Convergence of the attacker’s NE strategies under EUT.
1, one can see that the most computationally demanding opera-
tion of the algorithm is Step 5 in which each player chooses the
action that maximizes its payoff given the perceived empirical
frequencies of the actions of the opponent. Given that the action
space of each of the players is discrete, this consists of searching
over all the elements of each player’s action space. This search,
however, requires very low computational complexity which
grows linearly with the size of the action spaces of each player.
As a result, computing Step 5 at each iteration requires a very
short amount of time. All other needed computations in Table 1,
steps 6-10, are simple algebraic computations requiring a very
short execution time. Hence, the execution time of each iteration
of the algorithm, and as a result its total convergence time, is
practically very short.
For instance, Figs. 14–17 show the convergence of the
strategies of the attacker and defender to the NE under EUT
and PT, respectively, for the case treated in Figs. 2-4 with
αa = αd = 0.5. In these set of simulations, the stoppage
criterion as defined in (9) and in Step 8 of Table 1, is chosen such
that 1M = 0.001. In other words, the algorithm is considered
to have converged when the change in the updated empirical
frequencies of all the actions of both players is less than 0.001.
Fig. 14 and Fig. 15 show, respectively, the convergence of
the attacker’s and defender’s mixed strategies under EUT while
Fig. 16 and Fig. 17 show, respectively, the convergence of the
attacker’s and defender’s mixed strategies under PT. Here, we
note that even though the number of iterations needed for the
attacker’s and defender’s strategies to converge is relatively high,
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Fig. 15: Convergence of the defender’s NE strategies under
EUT.
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Fig. 16: Convergence of the attacker’s NE strategies under PT.
it only took the algorithm 26.1 seconds to converge in the case
of EUT (i.e. Fig. 14 and 15) and 26.4 seconds to converge in
case of PT (i.e. Fig. 16 and Fig 17) using a 2.53 GHz processor
and 3GB RAM computer. Here, we note that the convergence
required a large number of iterations due to two main reasons:
i) the very small convergence criterion 1M that we have chosen,
and ii) the decreasing influence of each iteration when the
number of iterations grows large. In fact, as can be seen from
Step 6 in Table 1, as the number of iterations k increases, the
effect of each iteration on updating the empirical frequency
decreases. As such, for a very small convergence criterion, it
would require the algorithm a large number of iterations to
converge. However, since the computational requirement of the
algorithm is very low, the execution of each iteration takes a very
short time. Hence, as can be seen from our generated results,
even though the algorithm required a large number of iterations,
the total convergence time is kept practically small. Moreover,
an operator can increase 1M , if needed, in order to have a faster
convergence, at the expense of reaching an approximate rather
than exact equilibrium point.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a novel game-theoretic
approach for modeling the interactions between hardware man-
ufacturers, who can act as attackers by inserting hardware
trojans, and companies or agencies, that act as defenders that
test the circuits for hardware torjans. We have formulated the
problem as a noncooperative game between the attacker and the
defender, in which the attacker chooses the optimal trojan type
to insert while the defender chooses the best testing strategy,
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Fig. 17: Convergence of the defender’s NE strategies under PT.
from a set of trojan types. To account for the uncertainty
and risk in the decision making processes, we have proposed
a novel framework, based on the emerging tools of prospect
theory, for analyzing the proposed game. To solve the game
for both conventional game theory and for prospect theory,
we have proposed a fictitious play-based algorithm and shown
its guaranteed convergence to an equilibrium point. Thorough
analytical and simulation results have been derived to assess
the outcomes of the proposed games. Our results have shown
that the use of prospect-theoretic considerations can provide
insightful information on how irrational behavior, uncertainty,
and risk can impact the interactions between an attacker and
defender in a hardware trojan detection game.
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APPENDIX
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Starting first with the EUT case, since for the case in which
no player is a winner the expected utility of the attacker is equal
to that of the defender and the MSNE strategies of the attacker
are unique, we solve for F from the perspective of the attacker’s
MSNE. In particular,{
UEUTa (p
∗EUT
d ,p
∗EUT
a ) = p
∗EUT
a
′ ·Md · p∗EUTd = 0,
UEUTd (p
∗EUT
d ,p
∗EUT
a ) = p
∗EUT
d
′ ·Ma · p∗EUTa = 0,
(17)
where p∗EUTa
′ is the transpose of p∗EUTa . Here, the expected
utility of the defender requires one to first compute the MSNE
of the attacker using Ma. Based on the indifference principle, at
the defender’s MSNE, we have Ud(AB,p∗a) = Ud(AC,p
∗
a) =
· · · = Ud(CD,p∗a). Moreover, we have:
[Ud(AB,p
∗
a) Ud(AC,p
∗
a) · · ·Ud(CD,p∗a)]T = Ma · p∗EUTa
(18)
Because the mixed strategy of the defender is nonnegative,
i.e. p∗EUTd ≥ 0, we have
p∗EUTd
′ ·Ud(sd,p∗a) =0
Ud(sd,p
∗
a) =0
∴ Ma · p∗EUTa =0.
(19)
In particular, for Ud(AB,p∗a),
Fp∗a(A) + Fp
∗
a(B)− 4p∗a(C)− 12p∗a(D) = 0,
F vEUT =
4p∗a(C) + 12p
∗
a(D)
p∗a(A) + p∗a(B)
.
(20)
For the case of PT, similarly to the case of EUT, we have{
UPTa (p
∗PT
d ,p
∗PT
a ) = p
∗PT
a
′ ·Md · p∗PTd = 0,
UPTd (p
∗PT
d ,p
∗PT
a ) = p
∗PT
d
′ ·Ma · p∗PTa = 0.
(21)
Although, at the the mixed NE the indifference principle
holds, Ma · p∗PTa 6= 0 due to the nonlinear weighting effect.
Thus,
F vPT =
p∗PTa
′ ·

0 0 0 1 1 1
0 2 2 0 0 2
4 0 4 0 4 0
12 12 0 12 0 0
 · p∗PTd
p∗PTa
′ ·

1 1 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 1
 · p∗PTd
(22)
Since the denominator is not 0, then F vPT can be computed.
